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$IWHUVHHLQJDQHOHSKDQWPRWKHUVWDQGLQJRYHUKHUGHDGLQIDQW¶VERG\SURGGLQJWKHEDE\DVLI
to wake it up (1, 2), it is hard not to believe that elephants grieve²just as we do. It seems 
some emotions are so elemental they are evident even in non-human animals. At the same 
WLPHVRPHFXOWXUHV¶HPRWLRQDOZRUOGVPD\DSSHDUXWWHUO\DOLHQWRRWKHUVFor example, in 
Papua New Guinea, Baining hosts feel awumbuk when guests leave after having stayed 
overnight. Awumbuk, which has been called a three-GD\³VRFLDOKDQJRYHU´OHDYHVSHRSOH
listless, unable to wake in the morning or to complete mundane tasks. How do we reconcile 
these disparate observations? Does each culture have its own emotional universe or is there a 
bedrock of similarity that unites us all? Centuries of debate has not resolved the issue, but on 
page XYZ, Jackson et al. present the most ambitious cross-cultural study to date of emotion 
concepts, mapping semantic networks for over a third of the ZRUOG¶VODQJXDJHVWRUHYHDO
substantial variability in how emotion concepts are expressed cross-culturally. 
It is difficult to study the subjective, phenomenal aspects of emotions, but language can 
provide insight into how people conceptualize their inner worlds (5). Communicative need 
and cultural preoccupations lead people to assign words to specific concepts, so when 
unrelated languages exhibit recurrent patterns, despite idiosyncratic differences between 
cultures, this is indicative of common conceptualizations. Using a database of more than 
2,000 unique concepts, including 24 emotion concepts, Jackson et al. examine the semantics 
of emotion across 2,474 languages, from 20 language families, by establishing how emotion 
concepts are connected to one another. This builds on a venerable tradition in linguistics 
where the meaning of a word is determined not only on the basis of what it refers to, but also 
through the relations between words. Jackson et al. UHO\RQGDWDDERXW³FROH[LILFDWLRQV´ZKHUH
a single word is used to refer to multiple concepts. Persian, for example, does not have 
GLVWLQFWZRUGVIRUµJULHI¶DQGµUHJUHW¶LQVWHDGænduh refers to both. In Dargwa (spoken in the 
Republic of DageVWDQWKHWHUPGDUGLVXVHGIRUµJULHI¶DQGµDQ[LHW\¶8VLQJQHWZRUN
analyses on such colexifications in thousands of languages, Jackson et al. show that the 
semantic structure of emotion concepts varies dramatically across language families. They 
find that the semantics of emotion vary far more than the semantics of color, a domain with 
known cross-linguistic variation (6). The variation is not unbounded, however. Jackson et al. 
find that all languages differentiate emotions primarily by valence and arousal. Moreover, the 
closer languages are geographically, the more similar their networks.  
These findings raise many questions. Are emotion semantics similar among neighbours 
because of shared communicative or cultural needs? Other work suggests that people from 
Western individualistic cultures report their ideal affective state as involving high arousal 
HJµKDSSLQHVV¶ EHLQg upbeat), but people from Eastern collectivist cultures prefer low 
DURXVDOHPRWLRQVHJµKDSSLQHVV¶ EHLQJVROHPQDQGUHVHUYHG6XFKEURDGGLIIHUHQFHV
suggest similar cultural scripts among neighbours. Jackson et al. leave open the question of 
what drives similarities between neighbouring languages. They may borrow nifty concepts 
from their neighbours (e.g., English has borrowed schadenfreude from German), or inherit 
from a common ancestor (e.g., English rue and German Reue IRUµUHPRUVH¶LVLQKHULWHGIURP
proto-Germanic *KUHZZǀ). Since languages that descended from a common ancestral 
language (like English and German) are found close together, Jackson et al. do not adjudicate 
between borrowing versus inheritance, but they pave the way for such explorations through 
phylogenetic methods and computational simulations of historical process (8).  
One of the exciting things about the Jackson et al. study is that it incorporates data from small 
languages, with speakers numbering in the thousands, as well as large languages with 
millions of speakers that are the usual target of cross-cultural study. But it is important to be 
aware of the limitations of their data. Perhaps the geographical similarities do not reflect 
shared emotion semantics so much as shared traditions of linguistic description. For example, 
most small languages are under-described and much of what we know about them comes 
from lists of words they use. Since field linguists usually work on languages in a particular 
part of the world, they may use a lingua franca to elicit word lists from multiple languages 
making such lists prone to areal traditions of nomenclature and analysis, and to the well-
known limitations of translation (9), especially fraught with potential for semantic slippage 
and misunderstanding when translating ineffable emotion concepts. So similarity between 
neighbouring languages may be influenced by methodological and analytic choices of 
linguists. A challenge for the future is to establish word meanings not just through translation, 
but through systematic elicitation methods too (10). 
In the approach taken by Jackson et al., concepts are treated as Platonic ideals: there are 
WKLQJVLQWKHZRUOGHJµJULHI¶DQGµUHJUHW¶DQGZRUGVVLPSO\UHIHUWRWKHVHSUH-existing 
concepts. Jackson et al. show differences in the connectivity between these concepts. But the 
basic assumption of universal concepts is problematic, since numerous studies find 
tremendous variation in the concepts themselves (11). For example, if a language has a single 
term that encompasses the continuous color spectrum encompassing hues ranging from green 
WREOXHLWVHHPVZURQJWRVD\WKDWODQJXDJHKDVWZRFRQFHSWVµJUHHQ¶DQGµEOXH¶,QVWHDGLWLV
more parsimonious to posit a unitary concHSWµJUXH¶6LPLODUO\LIDODQguage has a term 
HQFRPSDVVLQJµJULHI¶DQGµUHJUHW¶DVLQ3HUVLDQænduh, one might wonder whether there are 
really two distinct concepts in Persian rather than a single underlying meaning. This reflects a 
general debate in which some linguists favor analyses of meaning in terms of polysemy 
(multiple concepts) and others monosemy (unitary concept). If basic concepts differ as 
indicated by prior work (12), then comparing networks across languages becomes even 
trickier.  
None of this undermines the diversity uncovered by Jackson et al. If anything it suggests 
there may be more variation to unpack. Whereas previous studies have focused on close 
comparison of one or two cultures and a limited selection of emotions, it is hard to dispute the 
cross-cultural variDWLRQXQFRYHUHGE\WKHXQSUHFHGHQWHGVFDOHRI-DFNVRQHWDO¶VVWXG\
Critically, they shed light on how people conceptualize emotions through language, but not 
necessarily how people experience emotions. This leads back to the question of whether 
different ways of talking about emotions change how people experience emotions. Some 
evidence suggests it does not (12, 13), while other studies show compelling evidence for such 
DQLQIOXHQFH-DFNVRQHWDO¶VLPSRUWDQWFRQWULEXWLRQHQDEOHVUHVHDUFKHUVWRSLQ-point 
where languages differ in their emotion semantics, to guide future empirical inquiry, and then 
perhaps we will finally be able to answer this most fundamental of questions. 
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